



Class, Property, and Authority: Dahrendorf's Critique of Marx's Theory of Class

Author(s): Lawrence E. Hazelrigg

Source: *Social Forces*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Jun., 1972), pp. 473-487

Published by: University of North Carolina Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2576790>

Accessed: 03/08/2010 05:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uncpress>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



University of North Carolina Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Social Forces*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

*Class, Property, and Authority: Dahrendorf's Critique of Marx's Theory of Class**

LAWRENCE E. HAZELRIGG, *Indiana University*

ABSTRACT

The central concern of this paper is the conceptual interrelationship among "class," "property," and "authority"; the context is Dahrendorf's well-known critique of Marx's theory of class, wherein Dahrendorf contends that Marx erroneously specified the determinant of class, in part because of his alleged reliance on organismic analogies. After reviewing certain features of the structure of Marx's theory, the paper examines the foregoing and two related criticisms made by Dahrendorf, and concludes that the latter (1) overlooks crucial characteristics of Marx's theory, (2) engages in confused comparisons of "organism" and "society" in order to support part of his critique, (3) misrepresents Marx's usage of "property," (4) obfuscates the concept of authority by equating it with domination, and therefore (5) constructs an alleged supersedent to Marx's theory of class that is actually grounded not in class or any other material difference but in the fabric of justifications ("ideologies," "derivations," etc.) that are socially provided the material differences.

In his study of *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Dahrendorf (1959) sets forth a number of criticisms of Marx's theory of class, in anticipation of his own intended supersedure of that theory. Three of these criticisms are the concern of this paper: first, and most important, Dahrendorf's critical remarks about Marx's conceptualization of class, in particular the relationship between property and authority vis-à-vis the structural conditions of class formation; second, his criticisms of Marx's analysis of structural change; third, his contention that Marx claimed for his theory an improperly broad scope. We shall examine each of these charges, especially the first-mentioned, in some detail and attempt to show that they are host to serious misapprehensions of Marx's theory and to obfuscations of the concepts of property and authority with respect to that theory.¹ In the section that follows, Dahrendorf's statements of criticism are presented

briefly, and then in a subsequent section we address the particulars of each of his arguments. Inasmuch as his criticisms are faulted not only by the manner in which he employs the concept "authority" and interprets Marx's usage of "property" but also by certain failures in understanding the structure of Marx's theory of class, it will be necessary to interject some considerations of such matters as the logical characteristics of the Marxian theory.

It should be stressed that our argument is *not* that all of Dahrendorf's points in critique are ill-founded—quite to the contrary in some instances, as for example, his (1959:145) recognition that Marx "deliberately avoided" in his structural analyses a corresponding concern with the "relation between social roles and their personnel." One of the most underdeveloped parts of Marx's theory is (still) that which pertains to class behavior at the interpersonal level, especially the part of it that rests upon considerations of class consciousness.²

Similarly, we must agree at the outset about another important matter. Marx was political activist and polemicist as well as sociological

* Special acknowledgement is due to Joseph Lopreato and Barclay Johnson, who provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The author of course retains sole responsibility for any errors that may have been committed.

¹ For present purposes, Dahrendorf's publications subsequent to *Class and Class Conflict* (1959) will be ignored (e.g., 1967a; 1967b; 1968), although in fairness it should be noted that he himself has questioned the 1959 formulation (cf. e.g., 1967b).

² Perhaps the "deliberately avoided" is a bit stretched, although it *is* arguable that Marx wittingly chose as a tactical concession to his polemics against the idealists a deliberate avoidance of issues regarding the causal significance of actor conceptions and attitudes.

analyst, and the passions of the former often interfered with the conduct of the latter. Very much a child of the enlightenment and long-standing Christian traditions of thought, he possessed a strong faith in an inherent (but historically restricted) goodness of man, in man's rational capacities, and in the inevitable perfection of man's social context. A forceful eschatology pervaded his entire work—indeed was indelible in the very fabric of his thought—and certainly this must be taken into account in any full appreciation of his work and its location in the human heritage. From the standpoint of the continued development of Marx's theory of class as a scientific theory, however, it is not simply useful but necessary to try to "wash out" the eschatological elements—to distinguish, as Dahrendorf (1959:118) put it, "Marx's 'philosophy' from his 'sociology.'" It is the remaining perspective and substance of scientific theory that Dahrendorf proposed to address, and that we address herein.³

THE ISSUES

The Nature of Class

Of the three issues considered presently, this is the most fundamental. Dahrendorf's critique of Marx's conception of class is made at two

levels; one pertains to the character and impact of class, the other to its structural determinants.

At one point in his discussion, Dahrendorf (1959:27) observes that for Marx "society is not primarily a smoothly functioning order of the form of a social organism" but has as "its dominant characteristic . . . the continuous change of not only its elements, but its very structural form." But elsewhere, and more generally, he (1959:133–137) reads Marx as having conceived of classes as "something like 'organisms' with a predetermined course of development leading to their perfection," and with the rather curious capacity to "affect the structure within which they have grown" only after having attained that condition of perfection, namely, "in the moment of revolution." Further, according to Dahrendorf, Marx conceived of classes as "always manifestly antagonistic groups," i.e., as consisting of individuals engaged in a continuous "class struggle," which Dahrendorf reads as "acute and violent conflict." These alleged elements of the Marxian conception must be expunged, the critic argues, although the distinction between "latent" and "manifest" conflicts can be used to salvage that part of the conception which treats classes as "groupings related to each other in such a way that their interplay is determined by a structurally conditioned conflict of interests."

The second level of criticism concerns the "structural conditions of the formation of social classes" (the *Klasse an sich*), specifically the "role of property in Marx's theory of class." Dahrendorf (1959:21) asks the question, "Does Marx understand, by the relations of property or production, the relations of factual control and subordination in the enterprises of industrial production"—the "loose (sociological) sense" of property—"or merely the authority relations insofar as they are based on the legal title of property?" To put it another way, "Is property for Marx a special case of authority—or, vice versa, authority a special case of property?" The answer, we are told, is that Marx took the narrower "legal concept" of property, that "his analyses are essentially based" on that conception.

To be sure, Dahrendorf (1959:21–23, 136–137) admits, Marx himself was "concerned with relations of authority"; but he supposedly committed the "obvious logical fallacy" of de-

³ Of course, to argue that Marx's sociological analyses are error-free once they have been disencumbered of eschatology and political program would be absurd. "Marx is often wrong," Mills (1962:37) judiciously observed, "in part because he died in 1883, in part because he did not use his own machinery as carefully as we now can, and in part because some of the machinery itself needs to be refined and even redesigned." The deeper one goes into Marx's analyses, the more prevalent the errors—understandably so, predictably so. But there can be significant profit in looking at the general structure of his formulation while holding at bay the problems of error and inconsistency that are bound up in its more specific elaborations and contents—both those problems that arise from eschatological and political-program sources and those that stem from empirical inaccuracy. For social science, after all, the important thing is not scholastic faithfulness to the verse and line of Karl Marx nor verification of his eschatological propositions (which it could not do in any case) but rather the assessment and improvement of the utility of those aspects of his formulation that may be regarded as scientific.

fining “authority by property . . . the general by the particular.” Thus, Dahrendorf takes exception to Marx’s proposition that “the determinant of social classes [is] effective private property in the means of production,” because of its presumable limitation of the utility of class theory to a “relatively short period of European history”—i.e., it “loses its analytical value as soon as legal ownership and factual control are separated.” Thus it is that Dahrendorf’s “superseding” of Marx’s theory of class starts with the replacement of “the possession, or nonpossession, of effective private property by the exercise of, or exclusion from, authority as the criterion of class formation”:

The specific type of change of social structures caused by social classes and their conflicts is ultimately the result of the differential distribution of positions of authority in societies and their institutional order. Control over the means of production is but a special case of authority. . . . Classes are tied neither to private property nor to industry or economic structures in general, but as an element of social structure and a factor effecting change they are as universal as their determinant, namely, authority and its distribution. . . . (Dahrendorf, 1959:136–137).

The Pace of Structural Change

A central feature of Marx’s theory, says his critic (Dahrendorf, 1959:130–131), is “the revolutionary character of social change,” which asserts that “a given structure can be changed and transformed into a new one only by radical upheavals. . . .” More generally, Marx’s “law of development was . . . little more than the law of development of an organism: the gradual unfolding of a ‘system’ to its inherent image.” Short of its destruction, the “structure, or ‘system,’ is as such immutable.” Thus, Marx allegedly freezes “the flow of the historical process in the idea of a ‘system,’” which leads him to the conclusion that structural change “exists only as revolutionary change.” To his critic’s eye, he has therein contrived an untenable generalization, one that testifies to “the insufficiency of all conscious or unconscious analogies between organic and social ‘systems.’”

The Scope of Marx’s Theory

Finally, according to Dahrendorf (1959:129) Marx offered a generalization “as impermissible as it is untenable” when he asserted that “the

dominant conflicts of every society [are] class conflicts,” and that “all social conflicts and all structural changes can be explained in terms of antagonisms of class.” This, Dahrendorf contends, constitutes the illegitimate transposition of a theory from its proper to an improper area of inquiry. Organized conflict groups are only one endogenous source of structural change, and such conflicts moreover take a variety of forms besides class conflict.

THE STRUCTURE OF MARX’S THEORY OF CLASS

Before we examine Dahrendorf’s criticisms in detail, we must attend to a review of certain aspects of the structure of Marx’s theory of class, including some basic features of his conceptualization of “class.”

Marx’s theory of class actually consists of two theories—or perhaps a better way of stating the point is to say that the theory comprehends two levels of theorization. Following Birnbaum’s (1968) reasoned terminology, we may distinguish these levels as “special theory” and “general theory.” Briefly put—we shall return to this matter shortly—Marx’s general theory is a highly abstract statement of the evolution of societal organization. As such, it is not immediately applicable to any particular temporal-spatial location. In juxtaposition to the “empirical complexity” or observable, inferable phenomena in “everyday-world” society, the general theory is relatively devoid of content. Its elements are what Marx considered the fundamental universal (though his eschatology here intruded) characteristics of societal organization—foremost among them, class. It constructs from his understanding of the dynamics of these characteristics an explanation of the evolution of societal organization. Precisely because the general theory *is* a theory of evolution, it ignores those contents that are and have been peculiar to specific societies. And therefore the general theory, *by itself*, has very little if any explicative or predictive utility with regard to the observables of any particular society.

A general theory *can*, however, guide and inform the construction of special theories—i.e., formulations designed to apply to particular temporal-spatial locations in a manner such that each will have explicative and, perhaps, predictive utility with regard to the observables

of those locations. Such is the nature of Marx's special theory of class (which is the explicit focus of the bulk of his writing). Marx attempted to "plug into" his general theory the specific parameters of nineteenth-century European industrial-capitalist society and generate thereby an empirically accessible or testable explanation of observable phenomena (and also a prediction of future phenomena, though here again his eschatology importantly intruded). Certainly we may question the adequacy of his specifications; no doubt many of them are inadequate and therefore damaging to the explanatory power of his special theory. But such assessments must be predicated on a thorough understanding of the special theory, and that, in turn, can be achieved *only* on the basis of a thorough understanding of the general theory.

Early in his discussion, Dahrendorf (1959: 19) recognizes that Marx's major concern was employment of the class concept for "the analysis of certain laws of social development" and not for the description of "an existing state of society." On face value, that recognition would seem to evidence awareness of the important distinction between general and special theory with respect to Marx's work. But on the very next page, when he turns to a consideration of Marx's analysis of "the structural conditions of the formation of social classes," Dahrendorf decides "for simplicity's sake" to examine that analysis with reference to capitalist society, "since the question remains undecided for the time being whether [Marx's theory of class] can be applied to other types of society at all." Thus, the aforementioned evidence was illusory. Dahrendorf attempts to assess aspects of Marx's special theory—including Marx's conceptualization of that most important elemental term, "class"—without first acquiring an understanding of the general theory. In consequence, he detects in Marx's theory those "untenable generalizations" and "fallacies" that we reviewed briefly in the preceding section.

Two characteristics of the general theory are crucial to an understanding not only of the general theory itself but also of any special theory that is properly derived from it. One is the (at least) incipient populationist perspective of Marx's formulation; the other is the essentially ecological foundation of Marx's conceptualization of class.

The Populationist Perspective

It is by no means a recent discovery that Marx was well acquainted with the work of his equally famous contemporary, Charles Darwin (cf. e.g., Barzun, 1941; Berlin, 1959; Hyman, 1962; Hyppolite, 1969:126ff.; Mac, 1965:I, 135–142). Although the history of their relationship is still incompletely explored, we know that on more than one occasion Marx read with admiration Darwin's "epoch-making work on the origin of species." He was understandably impressed with the manner in which Darwin pursued his investigations on the basis of the materialist principle and undoubtedly found in that a degree of personal satisfaction and support for his own intentions of formulating a "natural law" of the evolution of societal structures. In *Capital* (1967:I,372), he suggests a parallel between Darwin's interest "in the history of Nature's technology" and his own interest in the "history of the productive organs of man, or organs that are the material basis of all social organization. . . ." And, as Hyppolite (1969:129) notes, when Marx "deals with technology and the transformation of man's forces and relations of production, he speaks about the invention of tools, machinery, and machine-tools like a Darwinian. He considers these inventions as extrapolation of a natural technology." Darwin's book, Marx explained in letters written to Engels and Lasalle during the period 1860–1862, contained "the basis in natural history for our view"; "a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history" (cf. Hyman, 1962:121–122).

The instructive point to be gathered from this intellectual affinity is that these two scholars, Marx and Darwin, shared roots in the same broader context of thought that had accumulated over the years and then reached a degree of synthesis in their respective works (cf. e.g., Barzun, 1941; Greene, 1959; Hyman, 1962). It was a context of pervasive "evolutionism," characteristic not only of astronomic and biological investigations but of philosophy and history as well. To observe that there is little in the work of either scholar that is truly original, that both owed great debts to a large number of predecessors, would be an observation of the "obvious" if it were not so often neglected. Such recognition in no way dis-

parages the evident force of their respective syntheses. But it does caution against malproductive attempts to understand either scholar's work independently of its context and its relation to contemporary endeavors. Something new about the character of Marx's theory may be learned by examining it through the lens of Darwin's.

For good reasons, then, strong parallels between the Darwinian and Marxian theories of structural development should be expected. To begin with, both are based in high-level abstractions of natural, historical, materially conceived structure (albeit in their literal presentations both are also ponderous with exemplification, illustration, and detailed description). At the same time, however, it may be argued that the two theories differ in an important respect—namely, in the degree to which the materialist principle is carried out as a basis for the explanation of evolution. It is an admittedly debatable point, but perhaps Marx had a somewhat clearer insight into evolutionary processes than had Darwin. At any rate, aspects of his theory show evidence of an additional insight, whether wittingly conceived or not. One of the weaknesses in Darwin's theory was its lack of clear recognition that the basic unit of evolution—the thing that evolves—is the *population* of organisms, not the individual organism itself. This “populationist,” as opposed to the “typological,”⁴ perspective holds that concretely existing individuals are the real entities (as Marx once phrased it, “who possess things and fight battles”), and that the diversity or variability of concrete individuals is also real, not mere illusion or accidental deviation from some preexisting “type.” Marx, as is well known, spent a good deal of energy ranting against the typological perspective of the German idealists. Perhaps it was this formidable task of coming to grips with and surmounting the very strong tradition of idealism represented in Hegel that constituted an advantage in the formulation of Marx's thinking vis-à-vis Darwin's. Unlike the latter scholar, who did not have to do battle with the Hegelian construct

in order to make room for his theory of biological evolution, Marx was obliged to develop extensively the materialist argument as it pertained to the structure of societal organization.⁵ Societies were conceived as the evolving units, but the conception was of societies as populations rather than as a series of reified “typical” organisms. This does not mean that Marx was laboring in his own inconsistencies when he availed himself of the analytic utility of classifications of population members. Although the criteria of division are less adequately defined, his classifications of societies (“capitalist,” “feudal,” etc.), for instance, serve much the same purpose as do species classifications of biological populations. Both are differentiations of relative frequencies with regard to a number of specified variables—or member variabilities—and not of absolute, ontologically discrete “types” (cf. Marx and Engels, 1947:13ff.).⁶ While it may be supportably contended that Marx's political-eschatological vision often interfered with his science in such a way that he underestimated the extent to which elements of the “old society” persist into the “new” (cf. e.g., Bendix, 1969:7–11), we must realize that this error in thinking was the effusion of his eschatology, and that it was inconsistent with his scientific theory of societal evolution, strictly defined.

Class as Ecological Unit

Despite the fact that Marx did engage in the use of organismic and gynecological metaphors (e.g., “the womb of society”), in his general theory—and also in special theories derived from it—class is not essentially characterized as “something like an organism.” Rather, class is *first and most fundamentally* the evolutionary *ecological organization* of a societal *population*

⁵ This is not meant to suggest that Marx “surmounted” Hegelian idealism completely; the eschatology in his thought shows clearly that he did not (cf. Hyppolite, 1969).

⁶ As noted earlier, and in a different context, Marx paid little attention to the vehicle of transmission (symbol) whereby the experiences of individuals are built into societal structure and transmitted from generation to generation, just as Darwin neglected the comparable vehicle in biological evolution (gene). But then both symbolic interactionism and genetics were virtually nonexistent in the mid-nineteenth century.

⁴ These terms are borrowed from the literature of biological theory, in particular the synthetic theory of evolution (cf. e.g., Mayr, 1963; Simpson, 1953; Tax, 1960).

of socially existent biological organisms—i.e., individual human beings. As such, its development is no more (but also no less) predetermined than the sense in which the ecological organization of any population of organisms is evolutionarily predetermined. Given this conceptual foundation, it is easy to understand Marx's claim that class is the most basic unit of behavioral organization in a societal population. The parallel to the species population is straightforward: class describes the relationship of the population members first to their environments (including the "man-made") and, by that, then to each other. The first element of this relationship, the essentially ecological element, is one of resource production: before anything else, man must put together in accessible, usable form a sufficient reservoir of the things that sustain individual life. The second and derivative element of the relationship refers to that social arrangement of population members wherein control of the means of resource production, and therefore of the produced resources themselves, is differentially distributed.⁷

Based on this fundamental relationship of resource production, one can in principle divide any population of N members into N categories, each containing only one member and each occupying a discrete rank in a hierarchy of dominance or control with respect to the means of resource production. But for purposes of analyzing evolutionary change in general, and in specific recognition of the intensely social character of the human creature, it is necessary to treat collectivities of the population members. Any number of collectivities

⁷ To say that Marx's concept of class refers at root to the ecological organization of a population does not, of course, deny that class is also a social category and, potentially at least, a social-consciousness category. The statement merely emphasizes the ecological foundation of Marx's conceptualization: the differential access of individual population members to environmental resources (including the manufactured). Unquestionably, class involves "more" than ecological organization, "more" than ecological conflict; even so, class as a highly developed form of group consciousness in which the members become increasingly aware of contradictory group interests and the struggle becomes increasingly conscious—i.e., class in the sense of the *Klasse für sich*—still refers at bottom to an ecological organization of population members and to ecological conflicts.

with more or less differentiated relations of control with regard to the means of production may be distinguishable (cf. Ollman, 1968); and theoretically all but one of them will stand in a position of ecological dominance to at least one other. However, reduction procedures based on the rules of asymmetry and transitivity may be applied to this multisected population, with the eventual yield of a highly abstracted dichotomous division between the dominant ecological unit (more discretely organized into families, clans, tribes, packs, gaggles, herds, and so forth) and all other units treated as a single subordinate unit. The resulting degree of abstraction of individual variability (but in which the units are still based) enhances the power of the analytic unit in investigations of evolutionary structural change of the population.

Strictly speaking, the evolving unit is not the class but the population as a whole, species or society. However, the ecological relations of class constitute the basic dynamic force in the evolution of populations. This is precisely what lay behind Marx's thinking when he insisted that classes are manifestly antagonistic groupings, each "engaged in a common struggle against another class" (cf. Dahrendorf, 1959: 134). The "struggle" is not unlike the abstractly conceived ecological conflict characteristic of other species.⁸ Whether the members

⁸ Darwin (1917:78), it is worth recalling, explicitly noted that he employed the phrase "struggle for existence" in a large and metaphorical sense; its intended meaning incorporates not only the more or less immediate conflicts of dominance and submission that occur within the life of the individual but also differential reproductive success (which is a class-differentiated variable among human as well as nonhuman populations).

Weber (1968:I, 38–40) refers to this underlying ecological relation of conflict (which we have located as the foundation of class) as "selection," which he differentiates analytically into two varieties, the biological and the social; he prefers to reserve the concept "conflict" as a socially meaningful category. That is a legitimate denotation certainly, but it does not deny the sense in which one can observe the ecological struggle of species or classes as a conflict. Again, it must be stressed that we are not restricting class and class conflict to the level of ecological relationship and ecological conflict (or "selection," biological and social); we are asserting that such ecological factors are the foundation of class, a position with which Weber essentially agrees.

are aware of it or not, they are engaged in intrapopulation (and interpopulation) struggle with regard to the natural product (including those that they themselves fabricate or process). And in a certain abstract sense, the struggle can be described as “violent” conflict—though generally “chronic” rather than “acute”—even though there may occur only sporadically what would be defined normally as “fighting.”

CLASS, PROPERTY, AND AUTHORITY

We have already observed that Marx did not essentially conceive of class as “something like an organism,” as Dahrendorf contended. But what of Dahrendorf’s discussion of class vis-à-vis processes of evolutionary development? It is here that we find the first clue to his failure to apprehend fully the evolutionary character of Marx’s theory—i.e., in his (1959:119–124) exposition of the concepts “structure” and “structural change.”

First, Dahrendorf argues that social structures are importantly unique because they, unlike organisms (“with which they are frequently compared”), “cannot in principle be analyzed independent of their historical context, but . . . are themselves subject to continuous change,” by which he means structural change. From here Dahrendorf moves to the seemingly related argument that societies but not organisms can undergo radical structural change during their lifetimes. To illustrate this point, he calls upon Radcliffe-Brown (1952: 181), who “has realized this peculiarity of social structures” more than most others: “an animal organism does not, in the course of its life, change its structural type. A pig does not become a hippopotamus. . . . On the other hand a society in the course of its history can and does change its structural type without any breach of continuity.” Then, after quoting a passage from Russell (1948:268) to the effect that structural analysis cannot reveal to us the relations of one object to other objects that are not parts of it, Dahrendorf asserts that this property is a limitation of, rather than objection against, structural analysis in matters of biological structure; but in the case of social structures it *is* (apparently) an *objection*, since these latter structures “carry within them the seed of other structures that lie beyond (fictitious) borderlines.” Whereas the study of biological evolution “can rest on structural analy-

sis,” in sociology the study of evolutionary process must be an “analysis of processes of change of structural patterns.”

Throughout this entire section of Dahrendorf’s discussion, then, there is the assertion that evolutionary processes in biological and in social structure are incomparable. But Dahrendorf supports that assertion by way of a contrast between concepts that represent significantly different orders of abstraction, namely his contrast between structural change at the individual level (the organism) and at the population level (the society).

In the first place, it is debatable whether even organisms can be meaningfully analyzed completely independently of their historical contexts; their individual developments are the resultants of interaction between genetic endowment, which is historical, and a series of environments, which are also historical. But aside from that, a *population* of organisms—species as well as societies—unquestionably cannot be so analyzed.⁹ Obviously a pig cannot become a hippopotamus in the course of its life. The individual pig is not the “evolving thing.” But the species *Sus scrofa*, or any other species of organisms, *can* undergo such change in structure. It did so in becoming *Sus scrofa*. Species as well as societies contain within themselves “the seed of other structures,” that is, structures that will be identified subsequently as different societies or different species. Such “seeds” reside in the great diversity of the individual members of the population, and in the myriad implications of that diversity with respect to the population’s environments. Dahrendorf’s distinction notwithstanding, the “analysis of processes of change of structural patterns” is as much the point of investigations of biological as of societal-structural evolution.

In these five pages of his critique, Dahrendorf (1959:119–124) does not focus directly on Marx but carries forth his extended debate with “structural-functionalism” (and Parsons

⁹ This does not imply that “society” and “species” represent equivalent levels of organization in natural evolution; societal organizations are internal to species organizations. It does mean that the more basic principles of evolutionary process are common to both levels; it also means that explanations of variabilities within the particular species or society at a particular point in time necessitates the appropriate derivation of special theories from the respective general theories.

in particular). Nevertheless, given his previous insistence on an organismic conception of class in Marx's theory, the assertions that he here makes regarding evolutionary processes and structural change lead him subsequently to the charge that Marx's "'law of development,' . . . the dynamics of capitalist society . . . was for [Marx] little more than the law of development of an organism"—that for Marx structure was "as such immutable" or changeable only "in one stroke" (1959:131). We shall return to this matter in a later section of the paper.

The second aspect of Dahrendorf's critique of Marx's conception of class concerns the question—what are the structural determinants of class? As we noted earlier, Dahrendorf argues that Marx's criterion of "effective private property in the means of production" is not appropriate, since this limits the applicability of class theory to at most only a few centuries of European history. Instead, he proposes, the determinant of class should be conceived of as the "exercise of, or exclusion from, authority," which he interprets as a more general relational category than property. This supplantation is not free of confusion, however, in part because Dahrendorf inadequately interprets Marx's concepts of class and property, and in part because he does not carefully consider a question that, while seldom the recipient of explicit and sustained attention from any quarter (cf. Friedrich, 1958; Jouvenal, 1957), has great importance to his own theory: what precisely is authority?

That Marx sometimes lexically equated "property" and the legal relation of "ownership" in his class analyses of nineteenth-century European societies is indisputable. No doubt he did not foresee adequately the future (and often exaggerated) significance of the so-called "separation of ownership and control." Certainly, too, in his early efforts at an analysis of this characteristic of the joint-stock company (in the third volume of *Capital*) Marx engaged in a somewhat enamored discussion of "the elimination of capital as private property . . . the abolition of the capitalist mode of production . . . within the capitalist mode of production itself" (cf. Dahrendorf, 1959:22). Once again Marx's forceful eschatology intruded: the joint-stock company was viewed as "a necessary point of the way to reconverting [private] capi-

tal into the [associated] property of the producers." But it is nevertheless evident that for Marx the central feature was *de facto* control, that *de jure* control was simply part¹⁰ of a historically developed "superstructure" of political theory and legalism that at a particular point in time was more or less synonymous with factual control. Dahrendorf would have us believe that Marx, *of all people*, did not understand that property relations refer most fundamentally to power and domination with respect to the production of resources.

The basic human activity in the production of resources is labor, which, as Arendt (1953) among others long ago noted, is for Marx not simply a "social fact"—though it is importantly that, too; labor is also a natural biological "force." In Marx's (1967:1,178ff; emphasis added) words, labor

is, *in the first place*, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reaction between himself and [the rest of] Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces. . . . By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. . . .

The labor process, Marx continues, consists of three "elementary factors": (1) "the personal activity of man"; (2) "the subject of that work"; and (3) the "instruments" of work. Some of the subjects of labor are "spontaneously provided by Nature," that is, are "all those things which labour merely separates from immediate connexion with their environment." Others are raw materials that have already "undergone some alteration by means of labour." The instruments of labor, in turn, are the things that man "interposes between himself and the subject of his labour," ultimately between himself and the rest of the natural world. These instruments are part of man's technology; and, along with his physical capability of labor, they constitute man's means of production—production in the sense of both labor that "merely separates" raw materials from their immediate connections and labor that further modifies already humanly altered

¹⁰ But an important and difficult part; see the sixth of the enumerated "program notes" in the fourth section of the General Introduction to the *Grundrisse* (Marx, 1953).

materials. They describe man's ecological relationship to the rest of nature. Or as Marx (1967:1,372; 1953:583–585) himself put it: "Technology discloses man's mode of dealing with Nature, the processes of production by which he sustains his life, and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his social relations and of the mental conceptions that flow from them."

The development or evolution of a societal population cannot be understood, Marx contends, without attention to this fundamental ecological relationship. The crucial feature of the relationship is that the population is internally divided into natural ecological units (classes), such that certain of these units—in high abstraction, only one side of a dichotomy—stand in positions of dominance with respect to the instruments and thus the "subjects of the labor process." In short, the determinant of the ecological unit is nothing less concrete than effective control over the means of production: i.e., private property, which may become elaborated as a "right" in some legal or formalized sense, but which is before that simply the ability to exclude others from access to and utilization of the instruments and materials of production and, hence, the product itself. Whether the source of that ability is partly or even primarily in authority makes no fundamental difference in the *fact* of control, although it does of course have a significant impact on social relations and at the level of consciousness. The matter of first importance for Marx is not the particular historical form of property, which can be understood only within its historical context. Indeed, in *The Poverty of Philosophy* (1936) he reserved some of his most scathing words for the classical political economists, who elevated bourgeois property to the level of absolute standard.

Dahrendorf's argument that authority refers to a *more* general phenomenon than does property, and for that reason is preferable as the conceptual basis of class, is troubled by an ambiguity resulting from two circumstances. One of these has just been examined: his failure to carefully distinguish in Marx's usage of the term between property as a legal relationship ("ownership") and property as simply the fact of control. The other is his insufficient conceptual distinction between authority and

control or domination. He (1959:166ff) borrows his definition of authority from Weber's (1968:1,53) conceptual treatment of *Macht* and *Herrschaft*, wherein the latter term is defined as "the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." Contrary to Dahrendorf's apparent presumption, this is *not* Weber's definition of authority, strictly speaking. For all his extensive discussion of authority and its "types," Weber unfortunately tends to leave implicit the *differentia specifica* that distinguishes authority from other particular forms of domination and control. But it is quite evident from his stress on the element of compliance irrespective of source or motive that, while the lexical meaning may indeed be rendered as either "domination" or "authority," he intends the above definition as applicable only to *Herrschaft* in the generic sense of domination (cf. Roth's editorial comment in Weber, 1968:1,62). "The sociological concept of *Herrschaft*. . . can only mean the probability that a command will be obeyed," regardless of whether the obedience results from considerations of expediency, from non-reflective habituation, from unexamined beliefs, or whatever. For Weber, authority refers to something a good bit more specific than that.

The general phenomenon of dominance and subjection can be divided analytically into relations of control based on coercion and, the category with which we are here concerned, relations of control based on assent. Assent may be acquired in a number of ways, only one of which constitutes authority. It may, for instance, be attained as the consequence of a rational calculation of advantages accruing from submission to the perceived capabilities of another person, i.e., the recognition that in terms of particular goals it is rational to submit to the commands of a perceived competence with regard to the accomplishment of those goals. This is assent to expertise. In principle, it is an implicitly contractual relation between allegedly free agents, i.e., individuals with unrestricted capacities of reason.¹¹ Assent may

¹¹ Cf. Weber's (1968:III, 943) roughly parallel discussion of authority and "constellation of interests." Also see in this regard Collins (1968:48–51), Moore (1970:53 ff), and Pareto's (1963) discussion of "Class II" derivations.

also be attained in another manner, namely, by appeal to the nonrational—to beliefs or “values” or, simply, faith assumptions. It is this that peculiarly constitutes authority: the instrumentalization of the nonrational to the service of relations of control or dominance.¹² Appeals to the nonrational are useful, of course, only to the degree that others are convinced by them. And in any case the basis of domination may revert to coercion. Nevertheless, the “assent” that is authority is not strictly one of voluntarism or the effusion of reason (cf. Blau, 1963: Moore, 1970:53ff.), for the ideal to which appeal is directed must have some prior acceptance among the potential subordinates, that is, a “validity” (*Geltung*) that is rooted in the *Vorstellung* of actors (Weber, 1968:I,31).¹³

¹² Friedrich (1964:42–43) defines authority as the securing of assent “by relating technical requirements to values, beliefs, or truths that transcend the particular judgments involved” in a concrete situation of action. Authority intervenes when “it is especially difficult or impossible to demonstrate rationally the adequacy of a course of action”; and “with regard to the contingent aspects of decisions, actions, and opinions [it bridges] the gap between rational demonstration and the requirements of the concrete situation.”

¹³ Dahrendorf, incidentally, underestimates the effect of appeals to the nonrational (i.e., authority) on subordinates and on their position vis-à-vis the superordinates. Reciprocal to the assent acquired there are implicit obligations on the dominant party: a “political theory” in the loose subjective sense has been articulated, which sets forth the terms of the authority relationship. It “tells” the subordinates what is expected of them but also what they can expect of their superiors, and thus the person “in authority” is bound by the content of his instrumentalized “theory.” This information the subordinates can use to their own advantage. Particularly those who are closest to the dominants, whose support and cooperation is most crucial to the dominants—Weber’s “administrative staff”; Dahl’s (1961) “subleaders”—can exercise a significant influence through use of this information. To the extent the dominants fail to abide by the restrictions imposed upon themselves by the “political theory,” there will be a “crisis of authority,” which is to say a crisis in the basis of assent. The locus of this crisis, and the conflict it represents, is not so much in the relationship between the dominants and those who are furthest removed from them, as Dahrendorf argues, but between the dominants and the “subleaders,” who are in closest proximity and therefore most likely

Weber points to this determinant of authority in his discussion of its “types.” In each case the source of the assent to dominance rests in belief in some objectivated “thing-in-itself”—i.e., something that is conceived as independent of and superior to (above) any individual or collectivity of individuals. In the rational–legal it is Law and the idea of the Rational; in the traditional, the idea of a sanctified Heritage; in the charismatic, the personification of various ideals in the Exemplar, the Revelator, or the Hero. To be sure, Weber’s conceptualization of the rational–legal “pure type” or “imperatively coordinated association” (*Herrschaftsverband*) incorporates notions of competency or expertise. But it is important to recognize that Weber is here describing rationality as *form*, i.e., a rational network of social positions and roles, organized according to such criteria as a specified sphere of goal activity, a set of rational rules (enacted laws) or procedures, rationalized means of membership recruitment and promotion, and so forth (Weber, 1968:I,217ff.). The question of the source of obedience (assent) in relations of control within that organizational form is an analytically separable question, which concerns rationality as *reason*. An actor may submit to a perceived competence as the result of a reasoned calculation of advantages with respect to his interests. This defines a relation of domination and subjection, certainly—one, moreover, that is deemed acceptable by the participants and that is a function of position in social structure (i.e., the status of “expert” within the status hierarchy of knowledge and technical skill)—but it does not define the particular relation of control that is authority. In a relation of authority within the rational organizational form, the force of obedience comes not from the potential subordinate’s reasoned calculation of advantage but from successful appeal to the nonrational, in other words, to the actor’s uncritical *belief* in the ideal of rationality. What the person who obeys authority obeys, “is only ‘the law’” (Weber, 1968:I,217; cf. also III,953–954); he obeys the enacted laws of the association precisely because they are “the law”—even though such obedience

to detect violations of the implicit agreement. See also, Collins (1968:50–53) and Lopreato (1968).

might be inconsistent with the verdict of an unrealized reasoned calculation of advantage.

The foregoing considerations of property, domination, and authority may be summarized as follows:

1. Authority is a particular mode of assent in relations of domination and subjection that are based upon assent. It is, in other words, a second-order subcategory of the general phenomenon of domination.

2. Property in the most basic sense of *factual* control refers to nothing more than the control of an individual or collectivity over some object(s), skill(s), or both.¹⁴ Assuming a cultural scarcity of the object and/or skill, the fact of control places the individual or collectivity in a position of dominance vis-à-vis others, the force of which lies in coercion, actual or potential.

3. Property strictly defined, i.e., in the sense of ownership or *rights* of control over something, places the individual or collectivity in a relation of dominance vis-à-vis others (again assuming scarcity), the force of which lies in assent (though it may revert to coercion). The assent may constitute authority, but it may also be a consequence of reasoned calculation of advantage.

Property is in neither sense a type of authority and therefore cannot be established from that logical standpoint as a less general category than authority. Indeed, only in its strict construction does property in any way relate to authority, and in that case authority is the logically *less general* category, since it is only one of the bases on which the element of assent in relations of dominance can be gained.

Thus we come full circle to the initial criticism in our evaluation of Dahrendorf's intended supplantation of property by authority as the determinant of class—namely, that he did not fully appreciate Marx's fundamental concern with property as factual control. Iron-

¹⁴ Recognition of this basic or "pre-justified" sense of property is at least implicit in Weber; otherwise his emphasis on the normative proscription of appropriation of office in his model of bureaucracy is meaningless. In real-world bureaucracies appropriation of office is logically impossible unless one can speak of property that precedes property right.

ically, one of the grounds for Dahrendorf's rejection of the property determinant stems from the circumstance that Marx often speaks of property as ownership, which includes *inter alia* authority as a mode of assent—i.e., the very concept that Dahrendorf proposes as the replacement of the property determinant. The most appropriate means of "salvaging" this aspect of Marx's theory, of course, would have simply been to distinguish carefully the two analytic senses of property.

THE PACE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE

It should be clear by now that Marx did not conceive societal development as Dahrendorf (1959:131) interpreted him: as "little more than the law of development of an organism: the gradual unfolding of a 'system' [meaning organism] to its inherent image." In the first place, the analogy is more properly to a population of organisms rather than the individual organism; in the second place, it is not the societal structure, or "system"—neither the organism nor the population—that "is as such immutable," as Dahrendorf implied. Quite the contrary: it is, according to Marx, the developmental process that is immutable, i.e., the principles and patterns of *change* in the structure of a societal population.¹⁵

Yet, Dahrendorf contends, because Marx froze "the flow of the historical processes in the idea of a 'system,'" he could conceptualize structural change "only as revolutionary change." Disregarding the complete misapprehension of Marx's theory that is revealed by the first of those quoted phrases, it is surely incontestable that Marx made great use of the

¹⁵ Interestingly, much as Darwin argued against interventionist efforts to prevent the survival and reproduction of "social undesirables" because it would interfere with the natural laws of biological evolution, but was contravened by the social Darwinists, so Marx adopted (though not always consistently) a *laissez-faire* stance with regard to the natural laws of societal development because little could be done to hasten the process, but was also contravened by his disciples—by the reformist advocates of parliamentary measures, on the one hand, and by the Leninist advocates of precipitative action, on the other. Both the Darwinian and the Marxian general theories were importantly revised by "hero types" with respect to the question of the pace of structural change.

word "revolution"—"revolution in the hay-fork sense"—indeed, to such an extent that it would seem to pose a contradiction to the populationist, evolutionary perspective of his theory. In part, perhaps, there was undetected and unintended contradiction in Marx's thinking, resulting (again) from the strong eschatological strain of his thought; perhaps also there was known contradiction in his thinking, resulting from the polemics of his political program—few words, after all, can add more drama to a theory than "revolution." But in addition to these possibilities, part of the contradiction is merely appearance, appearance that dissolves once we examine more closely the word "revolution" as a sociohistorical concept.

If the difference between revolutionary and evolutionary change is defined primarily as one of the "suddenness" or pace of structural change (cf. e.g., Brinton, 1957; Sorokin, 1947: 481–482), it is arguable that the former term is simply a social-consciousness category of retrospective evaluation of sensible experience, and that it actually tells us more about the observer and his store of knowledge of the reality examined than about that reality itself. The materialist position takes as a basic premise continuous change—matter in motion. To define revolutionary change ontologically, one must detect a beginning point or first event that is located closely in time to a completion or final event—unless one assumes as Polybius did the imagery of Ixion's wheel in conceptualizing "revolution" (cf. Hatto, 1949; Pareto, 1963). But this means that one is forced into the essentially nonmaterialist position of asserting ontological discontinuities, i.e., discrete types, as the fundamental stuff of nature.¹⁶ To define revolutionary change heuristically, on the other hand, the points in time can be stipulated by recourse to an *als-ob* proposition, thus avoiding the ontological problem. But this immediately reveals the arbitrariness of the choice of points in time. The question of whether a structural change was revolutionary becomes a question of where for *purposes of particular analysis* the investigator designated the "first event,"

¹⁶ See E. P. Thompson's (1965:320 ff.) argument against notions of "typicality" with regard to revolution, in his characteristically delightful "The Peculiarities of the English."

whether it was temporally proximate or near-proximate to the "final event" of a recognizably new structure.¹⁷ And of course the question is not solely of the analyst's conscious or deliberate choice of "first event" but also of his knowledge of the ontological past. A recognizably new societal structure, such as a society so defined "after revolution," is no more discontinuous with the prior societal structure than a recognizably new species is with the old. In Marx's metaphor, the "seed of the new" exists within the "womb of the old."

The conceptual distinctiveness of revolution, then, rests not in the "suddenness" of change ontologically considered but in the social perception of the origin of that change, and of its significance, on the part of the actors themselves (as well as captive observers). "Revolution" is both heuristic device and scientific category of the natural reality of social consciousness, as well as polemical tool of romanticism.

THE SCOPE OF MARX'S THEORY

One final matter that has been set within the purview of this paper concerns the question of the proper scope of Marx's theory of class. Dahrendorf (1959:129), it will be recalled, challenged that theory as "illegitimately transposed" from its proper area of inquiry. If our reading of the evolutionary-ecological aspects of Marx's theory is correct, this challenge is without foundation. When Marx asserted that "the dominant conflicts of every society [are] class conflicts" (as Dahrendorf puts it), he had in mind class as a specific structural categorization of societal populations that describes, first of all, the ecological relations of the individual members—their relations of control with respect to the means of production of resources

¹⁷ Kamenka (1966:122 ff.) defines revolution in terms of "sharp sudden change," but then interestingly equivocates by observing that "... what appears to the participants as the slow, gradual evolution of a new style of life may, to later generations, seem a sudden and revolutionary change. . . . [A]cknowledged revolutions are rarely sharp and sudden enough to take place at a clearly defined point in time. . . . The violent outburst that heralds the beginning of the revolution for the chronicler may be understandable only as the product of important, if less spectacular, social changes that preceded it."

—and, derivatively, the social relations and justificatory social and political “theories” that result from the circumstances of that ecological fact. The particular ecological relation of control was not held to be the only relation of control in society; it *was* held to be the fundamental fact, the first fact, of social existence and, by virtue of the conflicts inherent in it, the mainspring of societal evolution. Not *all* social conflicts, nor *all* structure changes, “can be explained in terms of antagonisms of class” (Dahrendorf, 1959:129). Explanation of such phenomena as sibling rivalry or incremental alterations in fertility rates, for instance, requires terms more nearly immediate than class. This is indeed beyond the scope of Marx’s construct. But from a highly abstracted evolutionary point of view, the essential features of societal structure were considered by Marx to be interpretable in terms of class.

The utility of Marx’s general theory to the scientific explanation of evolutionary processes in societal structure is problematic by definition. In making assessments of its utility, one must attend very carefully to questions of scope. The sociological analyses that were derived by Marx from the general theory, and thereby give it greater substance, represent a wide array of abstractions: from the very detailed and historically specific to the allegedly world-historical universal of the general theory itself; from the barely sketched interpersonal to the boldly stroked societal-structural. The general theory itself has immediate application only in the broadly defined basic processes of societal evolution. Applications to delimited historical contexts of interpersonal or institutional reality, to particular temporal-spatial locations, require a network of “bridging statements” as mediation—i.e., the derivation of an appropriate level of special theory that incorporates the parameters of the particular temporal-spatial location. It is a travesty of the character of Marx’s general construct to use it as adequate explanation of the historically specific details of structure and event in any particular society. Not without reason, Marx engaged in extended and intensive analyses when applying his evolutionary construct to delimited historical periods and, within these, to particular societies—e.g., *The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850* (cf. Ollman, 1968). To do

otherwise would be comparable in principle to use of the theory of biological evolution as adequate explanation of the historical particularities of structure and event in any given species population. In turn, it is an equal travesty to use the special construct that Marx derived for nineteenth-century European industrial-capitalist society—*whatever* the adequacy of that derivation for its intended purpose—as adequate explanation of the historically specific details of structure and event in twentieth-century industrial-capitalist society (for example) without appropriate respecification of the parameters.

A CONCLUDING COMMENT

Given the foregoing conclusions regarding Dahrendorf’s critique of Marx’s theory—which critique is the point of departure for his own intended “supersedure”—what can be said about Dahrendorf’s theory? Obviously this is not the occasion for anything approaching a full assessment of his complex formulation. In view of our assessment of his interpretation and critique of the Marxian construct, however, a few of the more “visible” considerations should be noted. At the very least it may be said that, whatever the internal consistency and fructiferous capacity of Dahrendorf’s formulation, it is of a significantly different character from Marx’s.

In principle, nominalistic license in the choice of referents for any word, such as “class,” may be unassailable; in practice, such license often tends toward a confusion of meanings and toward the subversion of previously formulated theoretical constructs incorporative of the particular concept. There is a fine but highly consequential line between replacements of the major referents of a concept and efforts toward the improvement of their precision. But Dahrendorf (1959:138) explicitly has in mind something more than nominalistic license: he seeks to refine the concept of class by reducing its referent to an allegedly more basic element of social structure, namely, authority.

It is difficult to determine exactly what meaning Dahrendorf attaches to the word “authority,” and whether in fact his analysis contains only one meaning or a number of possibly inconsistent meanings. In general, however, authority seems to mean a relation of control or

domination that has received some manner of common justification—but without specification of the *means* by which the justification is made. “Legitimate power” is a phrase Dahrendorf (1959:e.g., 166) employs from time to time, for example, although he also engages in the apparent redundancy of the phrase “legitimate authority.” If Dahrendorf includes within this conceptualization the strictly defined sense of the authority concept, i.e., the instrumental use of beliefs, including the more or less loosely constructed political “theories” that are a part of social consciousness—and there is no evidence that he does not—then his theory of class and class conflict is based in *justifications* (i.e., Marx’s “ruling ideology,” Weber’s “legitimation,” Pareto’s “derivation,” Sorel’s “myth”), and not in the prior arrangements that are the target of justification. It is a theory of conflict between groups who, according to the prevailing political “theories,” have *justification for asserting commands and demanding obedience* and those groups who have the corresponding *obligation of obedience*. The emphasis has shifted from the locus of conflict as the inherent emission of fundamental, “pre-justification” social arrangements (the Marxian emphasis) to the locus of conflict as the emission of multiple and imperfect consensuses. Whatever else Dahrendorf’s theory may be, it is *not*, properly speaking, a theory of classes, not a supersedure of Marx’s theory. It does not address the same issues.

REFERENCES

- Arendt, H.
1953 “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government.” *The Review of Politics* 15 (July):303–327.
- Barzun, Jacques
1941 *Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage*. Boston: Little, Brown (Rev. 2d ed., New York: Doubleday–Anchor, 1958).
- Bendix, Reinhard
1969 *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. New York: Doubleday–Anchor.
- Berlin, Isaiah
1959 *Karl Marx: His Life and Environment*. New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Books.
- Birnbaum, N.
1968 “The Crisis in Marxist Sociology.” *Social Research* 25(Summer):350–380.
- Blau, P. M.
1963 “Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority.” *American Political Science Review* 57(June):305–316.
- Brinton, Crane
1957 *The Anatomy of Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Collins, R.
1968 “A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology.” Pp. 42–67 in Reinhard Bendix and collaborators (eds.), *State and Society*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Dahl, Robert A.
1961 *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf
1959 *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1967a *Society and Democracy in Germany*. New York: Doubleday.
1967b *Conflict After Class*. London: Longmans, Green.
1968 *Essays in the Theory of Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Darwin, Charles
1917 *Origin of Species*. New York: Appleton.
- Friedrich, Carl J. (ed.)
1958 *Authority*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1964 “Authority.” Pp. 42–44 in Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds.), *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*. New York: Free Press.
- Greene, John C.
1959 *The Death of Adam*. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Hatto, A.
1949 “Revolution: An Inquiry into the Usefulness of an Historical Term.” *Mind* 58 (October):495–517.
- Hyman, Stanley Edgar
1962 *The Tangled Bank*. New York: Atheneum.
- Hyppolite, Jean
1969 *Studies on Marx and Hegel*. New York: Basic Books.
- Jouvenal, Bernard de
1957 *Sovereignty*. Cambridge: The University Press.
- Kamenka, E.
1966 “The Concept of a Political Revolution.” Pp. 122–135 in Carl J. Friedrich (ed.), *Nomos VIII: Revolution*. New York: Atherton.
- Lopreato, J.
1968 “Authority Relations and Class Conflict.” *Social Forces* 47(September):70–79
- Mac, Georg R.
1965 *Marx: Livog Værk*. Aalsborg: Fremad.
- Marx, Karl
1936 *The Poverty of Philosophy*. New York: International.
1953 *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen*

- Ökonomie (Rohentwurf)*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag.
- 1967 *Capital*. New York: International.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels
1947 *The German Ideology*. New York: International.
- Mayr, Ernst
1963 *Animal Species and Evolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Mills, C. Wright
1962 *The Marxists*. New York: Dell.
- Moore, C. H.
1970 "The Single Party as a Source of Legitimacy." Pp. 48-72 in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*. New York: Basic Books.
- Ollman, B.
1968 "Marx's Use of 'Class.'" *American Journal of Sociology* 73(March):573-580.
- Pareto, Vilfredo
1963 *The Mind and Society (A Treatise on General Sociology)*. New York: Dover.
- Radcliffe-Brown, Alfred R.
1952 *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*. London: Cohen & West.
- Russell, Bertrand
1948 *Human Knowledge*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Simpson, George Gaylord
1953 *The Major Features of Evolution*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sorokin, Pitirim
1947 *Society, Culture and Personality*. New York: Harper & Bros.
- Tax, Sol (ed.)
1960 *Evolution After Darwin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Thompson, E. P.
1965 "The Peculiarities of the English." Pp. 311-362 in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.), *The Socialist Register, 1965*. London: Merlin.
- Weber, Max
1968 *Economy and Society*. New York: Bedminster.

*The Failure of Freedom of Choice: Decision-Making in a Southern Black Community**

MURRAY B. BINDERMAN, *University of Miami*

ABSTRACT

The present study was designed to answer the question: Why, under Freedom of Choice plans of school integration did so few black parents make an integration decision, and continue to enroll their children in segregated, black public schools? A number of variables are proposed, tested, then interrelated in a model, which is tested and modified. Some comments are addressed to the limitations of the study, and the feasibility of a general decision-making model.

Back in May of 1954, the United States Supreme Court culminated a series of earlier de-

isions concerning racial segregation and discrimination by declaring segregation in public education to be "a denial of the equal protection of the law."¹ One year later, implementa-

* The research upon which this paper is based was carried out with the aid of Grant OEG-8-000043-1804 (010) from the U.S. Office of Education. An earlier draft of the paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, in Washington, D.C., on August 30-31, 1970. I am indebted to Bruce W. Aldrich, Hubert M. Blalock, M. Richard Cramer, Bruce K. Eckland, and James A. Wiggins for comments on an earlier draft.

¹ Although *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) is often cited as the desegregation decision, it may be perceived more accurately as a historical watershed; the culmination of decisions in the area of educational desegregation such as *Pearson v. Murray* (1936), *Missouri ex. rel. Gaines vs. Canada* (1938), *Sipuel vs. Oklahoma Board of Re-*